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A TRIPARTITE BATTLE ROYAL:
HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD AND THE ASSERTION OF
SEPARATION-OF-POWERS PRINCIPLES
Sean Mulryne ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, the Supreme Court of the United States has
granted a certain degree of judicial deference to the Executive’s decisions concerning war, military and foreign affairs, and national secu1
rity. The Court, however, began to exercise a more scrutinizing judicial review over these matters in 2004, when it decided Rasul v.
2
3
4
Bush, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, and Rumsfeld v. Padilla. A reasonable per5
ception drawn from those cases is that the Court, in defiance of its
traditional deferential approach, began asserting a more proactive
role for itself inasmuch as it sought to curtail the Executive’s unilat6
eral actions during the “war on terror.” This Comment addresses
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1
See infra Part III.A.
2
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
3
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
4
542 U.S. 426 (2004).
5
Throughout this Comment, these cases, along with Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.
Ct. 2749 (2006), will be collectively referred to as the “war on terror” cases.
6
See, e.g., David A. Martin, Offshore Detainees and the Role of Courts After Rasul v.
Bush: The Underappreciated Virtues of Deferential Review, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 125
(2005). Professor Martin writes at the outset:
The Supreme Court struck an important blow for civil liberties and
human rights in its trilogy of enemy combatant decisions . . . . It rejected the Administration’s remarkably sweeping claims to a unilateral
power to detain anyone the executive branch pronounced an enemy
combatant in the war on terrorism, a power assertedly beyond the effective review of any court.
Id. at 125–26; see also Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Supreme Court’s “Enemy Combatant” Decisions: Recognizing the Rights of Non-Citizens and the Rule of Law, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 409, 410 (2005) (arguing that the “war on terror” cases left unresolved
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the disputes surrounding our nation’s three branches and their appropriate spheres of authority in light of the Court’s most recent decision concerning Executive power in a time of active hostilities: Ham7
dan v. Rumsfeld.
In Hamdan, the Court struck down the Executive’s use of military commissions to try alleged terrorist suspects at the United States
Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, thereby culminating this series
of cases that question and ultimately rebuke, to some extent, execu8
tive power in regard to military affairs during “wartime.” In so doing, the Court implicitly and explicitly emphasized the need for Congress to assert itself in checking and balancing the Executive and its
9
anti-terrorism measures.
At its outset, this Comment assumes that our tripartite national
government requires reasonable restraints on the Executive’s use of
10
power that must be externally imposed by another branch.
This
Comment will argue that through Hamdan and the “war on terror”
progeny of cases, the Court asserted a more pronounced separationof-powers principle to countervail the Executive’s questionable ac11
tions. While reserving a role for itself, the Court in Hamdan has jus12
tifiably positioned Congress into the center of the debate. Likewise,
this Comment will suggest that, despite Congress’s contrary reasoning
and initiative, the Court’s role in the “war on terror” should be pre13
served.
Part II of this Comment will outline the factual and procedural
background of Hamdan, followed by an account of the Court’s opin14
ions in the case. Part III will then briefly highlight the separation-ofpowers doctrine; the Court’s traditional deference to the Executive in
war, military and foreign affairs, and national security; and the “war
15
on terror” progeny of cases. Part IV will explore the heightened
scrutiny implored by the Court in Hamdan and its implications upon

many questions, Hafetz still acknowledges that “these decisions affirmed the important role of the federal courts in limiting executive power in the ‘war on terrorism’”).
7
126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
8
See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to
Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 66 (2006) (“Hamdan v. Rumsfeld is a rare Supreme
Court rebuke to the President during armed conflict.”) (footnote omitted).
9
See infra Part IV.B.
10
See infra Justice Souter’s Hamdi dissent at note 290.
11
See infra Part IV.B.
12
See infra Part IV.B.
13
See infra Part V.
14
See infra Part II.
15
See infra Part III.
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16

our tripartite national government. Thereafter, this Comment will
explain why the Court’s decision and its invocation for congressional
17
action are justified, especially in light of the “war on terror.” Finally,
in Part V will briefly examine Congress’s response to Hamdan and of18
fer several criticisms of the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
II. HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD
A. Factual Background
Like the other Guantanamo Bay cases, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld arose
in the wake of the tragic events of September 11, 2001, and the con19
sequent hostilities in Afghanistan and Iraq. Following the September 11 attacks, Congress adopted a joint resolution known as the Au20
thorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which authorized the
President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks . . . in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by
21
such nations, organizations or persons.” Pursuant to this authorization, U.S. Armed Forces were deployed to Afghanistan, where they
combated the Taliban, an international terrorist organization suspected of aiding al Qaeda, the international terrorist organization re22
sponsible for the September 11 attacks. During the subsequent battles, Salim Ahmed Hamdan, along with hundreds of others, was
arrested by the U.S. Armed Forces and detained in the U.S. Naval
23
Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a military order
declaring that any non-citizen allegedly involved or participating in
terrorist activities “shall, when tried, be tried by military commission
for any and all offenses triable by military commission that such individual is alleged to have committed, and may be punished in accordance with the penalties provided under applicable law, including

16

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
18
See infra Part V.
19
126 S. Ct. 2749, 2760 (2006).
20
Authorization for Use of Military Force, 107 Pub. L. No. 40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
21
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2760 (quoting AUMF, § 2, 115 Stat. 224).
22
Id.
23
Id.
17
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24

imprisonment or death.” Around February 2004, military counsel
was appointed to represent Hamdan, and, in turn, counsel filed applications seeking disclosure of the charges against Hamdan and “for
a speedy trial pursuant to Article 10 of the Uniform Code of Military
25
On February 23, 2004, the legal advisor to the
Justice [UCMJ].”
Appointing Authority for Military Commissions (“Appointing Authority”) denied Hamdan’s applications, having determined that Hamdan
26
was not entitled to the protections of the UCMJ.
In response to the Appointing Authority’s denial of UCMJ protections, Hamdan attempted to challenge his detainment by filing
habeas corpus and mandamus petitions in the U.S. District Court for
27
the Western District of Washington. Thereafter, the government finally charged Hamdan with a conspiracy offense, specifically alleging
that
from on or about February 1996 to on or about November 24,
2001, Hamdan willfully and knowingly joined an enterprise of
persons who shared a common criminal purpose and conspired
and agreed with [named members of al Qaeda] to commit the
following offenses triable by military commissions: attacking civilians; attacking civilian objects; murder by an unprivileged bellig28
erent; and terrorism.

The government also accused Hamdan of committing four “overt
29
acts.”
B. Procedural History
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington
transferred Hamdan’s petitions to the U.S. District Court for the Dis30
trict of Columbia. During this time, the Combatant Status Review
24

Id. (quoting Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833, 57834 (Nov. 13, 2001)).
25
Id.; see also 10 U.S.C. § 810 (2006).
26
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2760.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 2761 (citation omitted) (quotations omitted).
29
Id. These acts included (1) “act[ing] as Osama bin Laden’s bodyguard and
personal driver, believ[ing] all the while bin Laden and his associates were involved
in terrorist acts prior to and including the attacks of September 11, 2001”; (2) arranging for and actually transporting “weapons used by al Qaeda members and bin
Laden’s bodyguards”; (3) “[driving] or accompa[nying] [O]sama bin Laden to various al Qaida–sponsored training camps, press conferences, or lectures,” at which bin
Laden urged terrorist acts against the United States; and (4) “receiv[ing] weapons
training at al Qaeda-sponsored camps.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotations
omitted).
30
Id.
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Tribunal convened and determined that Hamdan’s detention at
31
Guantanamo Bay was justified since he was an “enemy combatant.”
Nevertheless, the district court granted Hamdan’s habeas petition
and stayed the military commission’s proceedings, concluding that:
(1) the President’s authority to convene military commissions extends only to “offenders or offenses triable by military [commission]
32
under the law of war”; (2) the law of war includes Geneva Conven33
tion (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; (3) Ham34
dan is entitled to the Geneva protections; and (4) the proposed
military commissions violate the UCMJ and Common Article 3 of the
35
Geneva Conventions because the military commissions allow for
convictions based on evidence that the accused would never see or
36
hear.
Upon appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court, concluding that: (1) the
Geneva Conventions are not “judicially enforceable” and, two judges
37
38
believed, would not apply to Hamdan anyway; (2) Ex parte Quirin
“foreclosed any separation-of-powers objection to the military com39
mission’s jurisdiction”; and (3) Hamdan’s trial by commission
would not violate the UCMJ or “U.S. Armed Forces regulations in40
tended to implement the Geneva Conventions.”
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision
On November 7, 2005, the Supreme Court of the United States
41
granted certiorari to Hamdan’s appeal in order to decide the narrow questions of “whether the military commission convened to try
Hamdan has authority to do so, and whether Hamdan may rely on
42
the Geneva Conventions in these proceedings.”
31

Id. at 2761. Enemy combatant was defined as “an individual who was part of or
supporting Taliban and al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.” Id. at 2761 n.1 (citation
omitted).
32
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761.
33
Id.; see also Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Common Article 3].
34
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761–62.
35
See Common Article 3, supra note 33.
36
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762.
37
Id.
38
317 U.S. 1 (1942).
39
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 2759, 2762.
42
Id. at 2762.
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With Chief Justice Roberts abstaining from the decision, a majority of the Court, including Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that the military commissions at Guantanamo
Bay were not authorized and thus violated the prescribed standards
43
of the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions. Justices Scalia, Thomas,
44
and Alito dissented.
1.

Detainee Treatment Act of 2005

45

The Court began its opinion by denying the government’s mo46
The government’s motion
tion to dismiss the writ of certiorari.
claimed that the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) foreclosed
47
the Court’s jurisdiction to hear Hamdan’s complaint. Relying on
48
“[o]rdinary principles of statutory construction,” the Court found
that the DTA did not preclude its judicial review in this case because
there is a presumption against retroactive statutory effect and a negative inference drawn when particular language included in one statutory provision is excluded from another provision in the same stat49
ute.
2.

Abstention

The government argued that the Court’s precedent in Schlesinger
50
v. Councilman dictated that the Court adhere to the “judge-made
rule that civilian courts should await the final outcome of on-going
military proceedings before entertaining an attack on those proceed51
ings.” In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that two comity
considerations warrant judicial abstention: that military discipline
and efficiency are best served by the military justice system without
interference from civilian courts; and that civilian courts should respect the congressional consideration given to servicemen through
the establishment of military courts and appellate review procedures,
including the Court of Military Appeals and its independent, unbi52
ased civilian judges. The Court concluded that neither considera43

Id. at 2775, 2786, 2793.
Id. at 2810 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 2823 (Thomas, J., dissenting), 2849 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
45
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-148, 199 Stat. 2739.
46
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762.
47
Id. at 2763.
48
Id. at 2764.
49
Id. at 2764–66.
50
420 U.S. 738 (1975).
51
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2769 (citation omitted).
52
Id. at 2770.
44
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tion applied in the present case, because Hamdan was not a member
of the U.S. Armed Forces, and because the military commission neither is a part of the integrated military justice system nor guarantees
53
insulation from military influence. Moreover, the Court found that
Ex parte Quirin provided precedent for hearing Hamdan’s case and
54
for refusing to abstain from the issues at bar.
3.

Congressional Authorization for Military Commissions

After briefly recounting the history of military commissions and
the constitutionally assigned roles of the Executive and the Legisla55
ture in matters of war, the Court examined Article of War 15 (“Arti56
cle 15”) and its contemporary embodiment in Article 21 of the
57
UCMJ. The Court explained that the Ex parte Quirin Court “did not
view [Article 15] as a sweeping mandate for the President to invoke
military commissions when he deems them necessary,” but rather
“recognized that Congress had simply preserved what power, under
the Constitution and the common law of war, the President had had
before 1916 to convene military commissions—with the express condition that the President and those under his command comply with
58
the law of war.” Therefore, the Court accepted Article 15, and its
current incarnation in Article 21, as a congressional preservation of
59
the use of military commissions under certain circumstances.
Turning its attention to the AUMF, the Court concluded:

53

Id. at 2771.
Id. at 2772. In relevant part:
That course of action was warranted, [the Court] explained “[i]n view
of the public importance of the questions raised by [the cases] and of
the duty which rests on the courts, in time of war as well as in time of
peace, to preserve unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of civil liberty, and because in our opinion the public interest required that we
consider and decide those questions without any avoidable delay.”
Id. (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942)).
55
Id. at 2773.
56
10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000). Article 21 reads:
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courtsmartial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other
military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders
or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by such
military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals.
Id. The Court explained that Article 15 is essentially preserved in the contemporary
Article 21. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774.
57
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774.
58
Id. (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28–29) (other citations omitted).
59
See id.
54
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[W]hile we assume the AUMF activated the President’s war powers, . . . and that those powers include the authority to convene
military commissions in appropriate circumstances, . . . there is
nothing in the text or legislative history of the AUMF even hinting
that Congress intended to expand or alter the authorization set
60
forth in Article 21 of the UCMJ.

Thereafter, the Court similarly posited that the DTA “contains no
language authorizing that tribunal or any other at Guantanamo Bay,”
but does reserve judgment on the applicability of the Constitution
and other U.S. laws to, and thus the constitutionality and legality of,
61
the standards and procedures used in these military commissions.
In summary, the Court declared:
Together, the UCMJ, the AUMF, and the DTA at most acknowledge a general Presidential authority to convene military commissions in circumstances where justified under the “Constitution
and laws,” including the law of war. Absent a more specific congressional authorization, the task of this Court is, as it was in
Quirin, to decide whether Hamdan’s military commission is so jus62
tified.

4.

Legality of Military Commissions

Having established that Hamdan’s military commission was not
specifically authorized by any congressional action, the Court then
examined whether the Executive’s unauthorized use of a commission
63
was appropriate in the given context. The Court began this evaluation by identifying three historical scenarios for which military com64
missions are commonly reserved. Next, the Court looked to the famous work of Colonel William Winthrop to discern the four
preconditions necessary to exercise jurisdiction by military commis65
sion over a person such as Hamdan. Conceding that these precon60

Id. at 2775 (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
62
Id. at 2775.
63
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774–75.
64
Id. at 2775–76 (quotations omitted). The three scenarios, identified by the
Court, in which military commissions are invoked include: (1) at times and in places
where martial law is declared; (2) when temporary military government occupies enemy territory or where civilian government is non-functional; and (3) as “‘incident to
the conduct of war’ when there is a need ‘to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have
violated the law of war.’” Id.
65
Id. at 2777 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 n.38 (1957)). The four preconditions for exercising jurisdiction by military commission are that: (1) the charges
are for “offenses committed within the field of the command of the convening commander,” or in a “theatre of war”; (2) the offenses charged “must have been commit61
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ditions are embodied in the UCMJ and dictate whether military ne66
cessity justifies the use of a military commission, the Court determined that the use of a commission to try Hamdan for his alleged
67
crimes was illegitimate and unlawful.
To begin, the Court articulated at length the inadequacy of the
conspiracy charge against Hamdan and the inability of a military
68
commission to try such a claim. First, the Court doubted whether
Hamdan’s alleged crimes satisfied Winthrop’s temporal and geo69
graphic preconditions. Second, the Court found that Congress did
not definitively designate conspiracy as a war crime, nor did precedent or the government’s examples suggest that conspiracy is “incor70
porated by reference” into Article 21. In addition, the Court clarified that international law, including the Geneva and Hague
Conventions, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, and
the laws of European countries in general, have not recognized con71
spiracy as a punishable crime in the law of war.
In the end, the Court found the legal insufficiency of Hamdan’s
charges emblematic of the Executive’s utilization of military commis72
sions when “military necessity” was not present.
Thus, the Court
held that the circumstances surrounding Hamdan and his military
commission did not constitute a situation in which, “by any stretch of
the historical evidence or this Court’s precedents, a military commission established by Executive Order under the authority of Article 21
of the UCMJ may lawfully try a person and subject him to punish73
ment.”
ted within the period of the war”; (3) the only individuals at trial must be
“[i]ndividuals of the enemy’s army who have been guilty of illegitimate warfare or
other offences in violation of the laws of war” and members of one’s own army “who,
in time of war, become chargeable with crimes or offences not cognizable, or triable,
by criminal courts or under the Articles of war”; and (4) the individuals’ alleged
crimes must be “[v]iolations of the laws and usages of war cognizable by military tribunals only” and which are “[b]reaches of military orders or regulations for which
offenders are not legally triable by court-martial under the Articles of war.” Id. (quotations omitted).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 2777–86.
68
Id. at 2778–86.
69
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2777–79.
70
Id. at 2779–84 (citations omitted).
71
Id. at 2780–81, 2784–85.
72
Id. at 2785 (“The charge’s shortcomings are not merely formal, but are indicative of a broader inability on the Executive’s part here to satisfy the most basic precondition—at least in the absence of specific congressional authorization—for establishment of military commissions: military necessity.”).
73
Id. at 2785–86.
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Regarding the legality of the military commission’s standards
and procedures, the Court first outlined the most controversial aspects of the commission, including: (1) the detainee, and possibly his
counsel, may have limited—if any at all—access to certain evidence
74
presented against the detainee; (2) the detainee may be precluded
75
from attending “closed sessions”; (3) any evidence, including “testimonial hearsay and evidence obtained through coercion” as well as
76
non-sworn statements, may be fully admissible; and (4) any appeal
by the detainee will be heard by a three-judge panel appointed by the
Secretary of Defense and comprised of military officers, only one of
77
which need have judicial experience.
Upon dismissing the government’s objections and distinguishing
78
79
In re Yamashita from the military commissions at issue, the Court
explained that the President may promulgate some procedural rules
for courts-martial and military commissions, but is restricted by Arti80
cle 36 of the UCMJ, which requires that the adopted rules not be
“contrary to or inconsistent with” the UCMJ and that the adopted
rules for military commissions be “uniform insofar as practicable” to
81
those rules of courts-martial. Ultimately, the Court concluded that
the “uniformity” requirement precluded the government from justify82
ing the military commission’s variant procedures. In other words,
the President failed to prove why the procedures of courts-martial are
impracticable and warrant deviation in the form of the military com83
mission in question. The Court was especially skeptical of the com74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Id.
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786.
Id. at 2786–87.
Id. at 2787.
327 U.S. 1 (1946).
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2788–89.
10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000). Article 36 reads:
(a) Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof,
for cases arising under this chapter triable in courts-martial, military
commissions and other military tribunals, and procedures for courts of
inquiry, may be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall,
so far as he considers them practicable, apply the principles of law and
the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases
in the United States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or
inconsistent with this chapter.
(b) All rules and regulations made under this article shall be uniform
insofar as practicable.

Id.
81
82
83

Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000)).
Id. at 2791.
See id. at 2792.

MULRYNE_FINAL_V2

2008]

1/7/2008 6:46:53 PM

COMMENT

289

mission’s jettison of the basic and essential right of a defendant84
detainee to be present at his trial. As a result, the Court held that
the standards and procedures of the military commission unjustifiably
differed from those of a court-martial, and thus the commission vio85
lated Article 36(b). Thereafter, the Court summarized:
The military commission was not born of a desire to dispense a
more summary form of justice than is afforded by courts-martial;
it developed, rather, as a tribunal of necessity to be employed
when courts-martial lacked jurisdiction over either the accused or
the subject matter. Exigency lent the commission its legitimacy,
but did not further justify the wholesale jettisoning of procedural
protections. . . . Article 21 did not transform the military commission from a tribunal of true exigency into a more convenient ad86
judicatory tool.

5.

Geneva Conventions and International Law

After rejecting the military commission’s procedures as violative
of the UCMJ, the Court also proclaimed that the commission violates
87
the Geneva Conventions. In reversing the D.C. Circuit’s determinations that the Geneva provisions are judicially unenforceable and, alternatively, inapplicable to Hamdan, the Supreme Court held that
Hamdan’s rights under the Geneva Conventions “are, as the Government does not dispute, part of the law of war[,] . . . [a]nd compliance with the law of war is the condition upon which the authority set
88
forth in Article 21 is granted.” Therefore, the Court found the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions judicially enforceable insofar as they, as “part of the law of war,” were incorporated into U.S.
89
law by Article 21. Furthermore, acknowledging the Executive’s argument that Hamdan was an alleged member of al Qaeda and that
Geneva protections do not extend to the U.S. conflict with al
90
Qaeda, the Court clarified that Common Article 3 “applies here
91
even if the relevant conflict is not one between signatories.” The
Court defended this interpretation by explaining that Common Article 3, unlike Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, “affords
some minimal protection, falling short of full protection under the
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2792–93 (citation omitted).
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2793.
Id. at 2794.
Id.
Id. at 2795.
Id. at 2794–95.
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Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a signatory nor
even a nonsignatory ‘Power’ who are involved in a conflict ‘in the ter92
ritory of’ a signatory.”
Common Article 3, the Court explained, guaranteed Hamdan a
trial by a “regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guar93
antees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”
94
95
Relying on commentary to the Geneva Conventions and Yamashita,
the Court stated that the “regularly constituted court[s]” prescribed
by the Geneva Conventions must be “ordinary military courts,” and
that Geneva provisions “definitely exclud[e] all special tribunals” including military commissions that do not conform to courts-martial
96
or that are subject to change in mid-trial. Regarding the “judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples,” the Court posited that “it must be understood to incorporate at
least the barest of those trial protections that have been recognized
97
98
by customary international law.” Citing to Article 75 of Protocol I
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and to the International Covenant
99
on Civil and Political Rights, among other sources, the Court concluded that these protections include a detainee’s right to be tried in
his own presence and the right to have access to evidence against
100
Therefore, the Court held that the Executive’s military comhim.
mission implemented to try Hamdan was unlawful insofar as it failed
101
to meet these requirements.
6.

Justice Breyer’s Concurrence

Justice Breyer’s concise concurrence, joined by Justices Kennedy,
Souter, and Ginsburg, directly repudiated Justice Thomas’s complaint that the majority’s decision would hamper the Executive’s abil-

92

Id. at 2796.
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796 (citation omitted).
94
See 4 Int’l Comm. of Red Cross, Commentary: Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 21 (1958) [hereinafter Geneva Cmt.].
95
327 U.S. at 44 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
96
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796–97 (quoting Geneva Cmt., supra note 94, at 340).
97
Id. at 2697.
98
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art.
75, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
99
Art. 14, ¶ 3(d), Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
100
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797–98 (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy did not
entirely agree with the majority on this point. See infra note 109 and accompanying
text.
101
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2798 (majority opinion).
93
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102

ity to combat terrorism.
In particular, Justice Breyer emphasized
the importance of congressional authorization and the role of Congress in justifying the Executive’s exercise of powers, especially when
an absence of immediate danger allows for consultation between the
103
governmental branches.
7.

Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence

In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy, joined in part by Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, acknowledged the separation-ofpowers principles implicated by the Executive’s military commis104
sions. In particular, Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority opinion, and posited that Article 21 of the UCMJ imported Common Arti105
cle 3 into U.S. military law and that Article 36 required uniformity
between military commissions and courts-martial barring any exigent
106
circumstances.
The military commission at issue, according to Jus107
tice Kennedy, exceeded these congressional limitations and had no
108
practicable justifications for its deviations from courts-martial.
Finding the military commission unlawful, Justice Kennedy refrained
109
from expounding upon some issues that the majority decided.
8.

Justice Scalia’s Dissent

Joined in his dissent by Justices Thomas and Alito, Justice Scalia
criticized the majority’s interpretations of the DTA on the grounds
that the statute “prohibits any exercise of jurisdiction,” even by the
Supreme Court, over the military commissions at Guantanamo, and
that the statute “became effective as to all cases” on its date of enact110
ment.
Justice Scalia concluded that the Court had no jurisdiction
absent “an explicit reservation of pending cases,” since the DTA expressly and unequivocally ousted the Court’s jurisdiction over the
present matter and precedent supports statutory jurisdiction ousting
111
for cases pending at the statute’s effective date of enactment.
102

Id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id.
104
Id. at 2800 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
105
Id. at 2803–04.
106
Id. at 2801.
107
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2808.
108
Id. at 2807.
109
Id. at 2809 (refraining from deciding whether the accused has a “right to be
present at all stages of a criminal trial,” whether Article 75 of Protocol I is binding
law, and whether Hamdan’s conspiracy charge is valid).
110
Id. at 2810 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111
Id. at 2810–11.
103
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Responding to the majority’s statutory interpretation of a negative inference that would enable the Court to exercise jurisdiction in
112
this case, Justice Scalia emphasized that the DTA is clear in its jurisdiction stripping, and that precedent and a “negative inference in
the opposite direction” support a “presumption against jurisdic113
Furthermore, Justice Scalia criticized the majority’s reliance
tion.”
upon the DTA’s legislative history as evidence of Congress’s intent for
114
the Court to have jurisdiction over cases such as Hamdan’s.
According to Justice Scalia, the congressional debates of the DTA represent views by both legislators who wanted to preclude the Court’s jurisdiction and legislators who wanted to preserve it, and that many
statements relating to jurisdiction were “undoubtedly opportunistic
115
and crafted solely for use in the briefs in this very litigation.”
Likewise, the DTA’s drafting history, Justice Scalia argued, “is no more legitimate or reliable an indicator of the objective meaning of a statute
116
In addition, Justice
than any other form of legislative history.”
Scalia pointed to several other considerations that disputed the ma117
jority’s conclusions and underlying assumptions.
Finally, Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority’s refusal to adhere to Councilman’s precedent and to abstain from adjudicating
118
these ongoing military proceedings.
Considerations of military necessity, final review bestowed upon the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme
Court, and “interbranch comity at the federal level”—between the
judiciary and the military—necessitate, in Justice Scalia’s opinion, the
Court’s abstention from interfering with the military commission at
119
issue.

112

See Id. at 2765 (majority opinion).
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2812–13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114
Id. at 2815–17.
115
Id. at 2815–16.
116
Id. at 2817.
117
Id. at 2817–19. These considerations included: (1) by exercising jurisdiction,
the Court would retain jurisdiction over, and burden itself with, “all Guantanamorelated habeas petitions”; (2) Guantanamo Bay is beyond U.S. sovereign “territorial
jurisdiction”; and (3) the DTA does not eliminate but merely defers the Court’s jurisdiction over habeas petitions from Guantanamo Bay, insofar as the Court may still
review the D.C. Circuit’s decisions relating to such petitions. Id.
118
Id. at 2819–22.
119
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2821–22.
113
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Justice Thomas’s Dissent
120

To begin his dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia,
emphasized that the Executive, namely the President, has constitutional and precedential authority to direct national security and for121
eign affairs, and that congressional authorization is not always nec122
Nevertheless,
essary for the President to effectuate his actions.
Justice Thomas assumed that Congress authorized the President to
123
try unlawful combatants when Congress enacted the AUMF.
Conceding the relevancy of Winthrop’s treatise and its four cri124
teria for determining a military commission’s jurisdiction, Justice
Thomas concluded that “[t]he Executive has easily satisfied these
considerations here,” and that “[t]he plurality’s contrary conclusion
rests upon an incomplete accounting and an unfaithful application of
125
First, in Justice Thomas’s assessment, the
those considerations.”
Executive’s determinations that the “theater of the present conflict
includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries where al Qaeda
has established training camps, . . . and that the duration of that conflict dates back (at least) to [O]sama bin Laden’s August 1996 ‘Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans,’” are justifiably supported by the
126
127
Next,
Executive’s inherent authority and by extrinsic evidence.
Justice Thomas quickly confirmed that Hamdan is a person triable by
military commission on account of his being “an unlawful combatant
charged with joining and conspiring with a terrorist network dedi128
cated to flouting the laws of war.”
Thereafter, Justice Thomas explained that the “nature of the offense charged” against Hamdan survives the plurality’s arguments because: (1) such charges involving violations of the law of war need not
120

With the exception of several parts including this one, Justice Alito also joined
Justice Thomas’s dissent. Id. at 2823 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Hereafter, unless otherwise noted, all citations to Justice Thomas’s dissent will refer to parts in which Justice Alito joined.
121
Id. (citations and quotations omitted). Justice Alito did not join this part of Justice Thomas’s dissent. Id.
122
Id. at 2823 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654, 678 (1981)). Justice Alito did not join. Id.
123
Id. at 2824 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 11 (1946)). Justice Alito did not join. Id.
124
Id. at 2826. The four criteria include: “(1) time and (2) place of the offense,
(3) the status of the offender, and (4) the nature of the offense charged.” Id. (citations omitted).
125
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2826 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
126
Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
127
Id. at 2828.
128
Id. at 2829.
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be stated as specifically as common law indictments; (2) the actions
of military commissions are to be upheld unless there is “clear convic130
tion that they are” unlawful; (3) it is inappropriate for the judiciary
131
to intrude upon the Executive’s war management; and (4) “a flexible, evolutionary common-law system is uniquely appropriate” for the
132
Analyzing the specific charges against
amorphous nature of war.
Hamdan, Justice Thomas first acknowledged that “membership in a
war-criminal enterprise and conspiracy to commit war crimes” is
chargeable before military commissions on account of the common
133
law of war.
Likewise, Justice Thomas again acknowledged that,
based on precedent, Hamdan is chargeable with and triable before a
military commission for conspiring and agreeing with al Qaeda to
134
Furthermore, Justice Thomas
commit violent and terroristic acts.
posited that military necessity, which the plurality sets forth as “the
most basic precondition . . . for establishment of military commissions,” is a determination reserved to military judgment and not that
135
of the courts, and alternatively, the jurisdiction of military commis136
sions is not dependent upon the exigency of the circumstances.
Regarding the UCMJ, Justice Thomas declared repeatedly that
Article 21, in and of itself, authorizes the Executive’s use of military
137
commissions.
Insofar as the majority’s interpretations of Article 36
were concerned, Justice Thomas argued that the President alone has
the authority and discretion to deviate the military commission’s procedures from those of civilian courts when he has deemed it “practicable” to do so, and that the commission’s procedures are not “contrary to” the UCMJ since these procedures do not implicate any of
138
In addithe few UCMJ provisions concerning such commissions.

129

Id. at 2829 (quoting In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 17 (1946)).
Id. at 2830 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942)).
131
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2830 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
132
Id. (footnote omitted).
133
Id. at 2830–31. Justice Thomas pointed to Civil War military trials as examples
of tribunals prosecuting persons for similar charges. Id. at 2831 n.7. Justice Alito
did not join this part of Justice Thomas’s dissent. Id. at 2823.
134
Id. at 2834–36 (Justice Thomas pointed to World War II, the Civil War, Winthrop’s treatise, and the actions of military tribunals in Nuremberg and several
European nations as evidence of tribunals prosecuting persons for similar charges.)
135
Id. at 2838 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
136
Id. (“Traditionally, retributive justice for heinous war crimes is as much a ‘military necessity’ as the ‘demands’ of ‘military efficiency’ touted by the plurality, and
swift military retribution is precisely what Congress authorized the President to impose on the September 11 attackers in the AUMF.”) (citations omitted).
137
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2825, 2840–41, 2845.
138
Id. at 2840.
130
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tion, Justice Thomas reconciled the procedures of Hamdan’s military
commission with the “uniformity” requirement of Article 36(b) by
holding that requirement as mandating uniform procedures only
“across the separate branches of the armed services,” and not between military commissions and courts-martial as the majority
139
opined.
Turning his attention to the majority’s invocation of the Geneva
140
Conventions, Justice Thomas posited that Johnson v. Eisentrager forecloses judicial enforceability of the Conventions, irrespective of Article 21’s authorization, because the Conventions require political and
141
Moreover, Justice Thomas
diplomatic, and not judicial, relief.
found that an alleged al Qaeda detainee is not entitled to Common
Article 3 protection since the conflict against al Qaeda, as determined
by the President pursuant to his inherent authority, is of an “international character,” and Common Article 3, by its very language, applies
142
only to “armed conflict not of an international character.” Alternatively, even if Common Article 3 was judicially enforceable and applicable to this issue, Hamdan’s case would still not be ripe, Justice
Thomas argued, since Hamdan has not been subject to a trial by mili143
tary commission or, consequently, a final judgment and sentence.
Justice Thomas further concluded that “[i]n any event, Hamdan’s
military commission complies with the requirements of Common Article 3,” because it is “regularly constituted,” is similar to those commissions that “have been employed throughout our history to try
unlawful combatants for crimes against the law of war,” and affords
“all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
144
civilized peoples.”
Finally, referring again to the Geneva Conventions’ text, Justice Thomas argued that the Third Geneva Conventions do not apply to Hamdan because, as determined by the President pursuant to his inherent authority, al Qaeda is not a “High
Contracting Party” as required by the Conventions in order for a
145
party to fall underneath its protections.

139

Id. at 2842–43.
399 U.S. 763 (1950).
141
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2844–45 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
142
Id. at 2846 (quoting Common Article 3, supra note 33, at 3318). Justice Alito
did not join this part of Justice Thomas’s dissent. Id. at 2823.
143
Id. at 2846–47. Justice Alito joined this and all subsequent parts of Justice
Thomas’s dissent. Id. at 2823.
144
Id. at 2847–48 (quoting Common Article 3, supra note 33, at 3319).
145
Id. at 2849 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations and quotation omitted).
140
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10. Justice Alito’s Dissent
In his brief dissent, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justice
Alito explained why the military commission at issue constituted a
“regularly constituted court” as required by Common Article 3, and
146
was therefore lawfully authorized by Article 21.
According to Justice Alito, for a court to be “regularly constituted,” the tribunal must
have been “appointed, set up, or established in accordance with the
domestic law of the appointing country,” but need not be “similar in
147
structure and composition to a regular military court.” Because the
military commission here was promulgated by a military order and
was to be routinely used, Justice Alito concluded that the commission
148
In addition, Justice Alito held
was, in fact, “regularly constituted.”
that if the military commission could not satisfy the “uniformity” requirement of Article 36, the commission would still be “regularly constituted,” because it is the commission’s variant procedures that may
149
be unlawful but not the tribunal itself. Likewise, Justice Alito noted
that any “procedural improprieties that might occur in particular
150
cases” are subject to appellate review.
III. THE ROAD TO HAMDAN:
THE “WAR ON TERROR” CASES
AND DIMINISHING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
Traditionally, the Court has deferred to the Executive on a
range of issues relating to war, military and foreign affairs, and na151
tional security.
Beginning in 2004, however, the Court granted
writs of certiorari to hear cases concerning the Executive’s actions in
Guantanamo Bay and its practice of indefinite detentions, which are
among the most high-profile and contentious aspects of the global
152
For the most part, the Court’s decisions in these
“war on terror.”
cases, culminating in Hamdan, effectively called into question the Ex153
ecutive’s authority to act free of any restraints.
This section of the Comment will begin by briefly setting forth
the separation-of-powers principles that underscore our tripartite national government and by highlighting some moments from the
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153

Id. at 2849–50 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2851.
Id. at 2852.
Id. at 2852–53.
Id. at 2853–54.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Parts III.A–C.
See supra notes 6, 8 and accompanying text.

MULRYNE_FINAL_V2

2008]

1/7/2008 6:46:53 PM

COMMENT

297

Court’s aforementioned deferential approach to the Executive and
154
the government at large during times of war and crisis. Thereafter,
this section will summarize the “war on terror” cases so as to provide
155
the recent context and precedent from which Hamdan has arisen.
A. Tradition of Judicial Deference to Executive in War, Military and
Foreign Affairs, and National Security
Within the confines of our tripartite national government, each
governmental branch has certain constitutionally prescribed responsibilities and obligations, and certain powers at its disposal to fulfill
156
Each branch in turn asserts
those responsibilities and obligations.
its powers as a check and balance on the other two branches to protect against the tyranny of accumulated power and to ensure that the
157
three branches operate within their respective spheres of authority.
In the interrelated contexts of war, military and foreign affairs, and
national security, however, the Judiciary has traditionally deferred to
158
the Executive’s judgments so as to enable the Executive to efficiently and effectively fulfill its constitutional responsibilities and obligations as “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
159
United States, and of the Militia of the several States.” A number of
cases and precedents speak to the self-imposed, diminished scrutiny
of the Judiciary in these matters.
At the outset of the Civil War, President Lincoln unilaterally suspended the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to his executive war powers and proceeded to detain a U.S. citizen without any possibility of
160
161
habeas relief. Sitting as a circuit judge in Ex parte Merryman, Chief
154

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Parts III.B–D.
156
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1 (2d ed.
2002). Chemerinsky writes, in relevant part:
The Constitution creates a national government and divides power
among three branches. . . . The division of powers among the branches
was designed to create a system of checks and balances and lessen the
possibility of tyrannical rule. In general, in order for the government
to act, at least two branches must agree.
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 364 (“The Supreme Court often has generally remarked that challenges
to the conduct of foreign policy present a nonjusticiable political question. . . . The
challenges to foreign policy that are probably most likely to be deemed political
questions are those directed to the constitutionality of the president’s use of the war
powers.”).
159
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
160
See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
26–60 (1998).
155
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Justice Taney declared the President’s actions unconstitutional insofar as they exceeded the Executive’s constitutional powers and en162
Nevertheless, Chief Juscroached upon those duties of Congress.
tice Taney deferred to the Executive’s strength by acknowledging the
unenforceability of his holding since his judiciary powers “ha[d] been
163
Predictably,
resisted by a force too strong for [him] to overcome.”
President Lincoln ignored Chief Justice Taney’s ruling, and Congress
164
later authorized Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of habeas corpus.
165
The Prize Cases, a conglomeration of Civil War–era cases, involved the condemnation of four ships that violated President Lin166
coln’s self-initiated, congressionally unauthorized blockade.
The
Court not only legitimated the President’s unilateral action but essentially deemed it a necessity by proclaiming that “the President is not
167
To allow the
only authorized but bound to resist force by force.”
President to effectively “resist” active hostilities and insurrections, the
Court declared that it must defer to the President’s “decisions and
acts” and his determinations of “what degree of force the crisis de168
mands.” Furthermore, the Court held that if the Executive violated
the separation-of-powers doctrine and encroached upon Congress’s
authority, an ex post facto ratification of the Executive’s action by
169
Congress would “perfectly cure the defect.”
As the United States entered World War I, Congress enacted the
Espionage Act of 1917, which “criminalized any speech that might interfere with military recruitment and was used to suppress political
170
Through a series of cases, the Court updissent during” the war.
held criminal convictions under the Espionage Act against First
171
Amendment challenges.
Affirming a conviction for defendants
who printed and distributed documents that compared conscription
to slavery and petitioned for a repeal of the military draft, Justice

161

17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
Id. at 149–50.
163
Id. at 153.
164
Steven R. Shapiro, Defending Civil Liberties in the War on Terror: The Role of the
Courts in the War Against Terrorism: A Preliminary Assessment, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
103, 104 (2005).
165
67 U.S. 635 (1863).
166
Id.
167
Id. at 668.
168
Id. at 670.
169
Id. at 671.
170
Shapiro, supra note 164, at 104; see also REHNQUIST, supra note 160, at 173.
171
See REHNQUIST, supra note 160, at 174, 178–82.
162
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172

Holmes in Schenck v. United States wrote: “[w]hen a nation is at war
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance
to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men
fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any consti173
tutional right.” Likewise, the Court sided with the government and
continuously upheld the Espionage Act provisions against other defendants who published and circulated articles and pamphlets that
were critical of the government, the war, and the draft law, and who
174
attempted to incite resistance.
During World War II, the Court infamously upheld the constitutionality of Japanese-American internment in the case of Korematsu v.
175
United States, which followed on the heels of Hirabayashi v. United
States and its vindication of governmentally imposed curfews for
176
Korematsu arose from an Executive Order isJapanese-Americans.
sued by President Roosevelt that preceded a general’s military order
177
and a congressional enactment that authorized the internment. In
light of this authorization, the Court deferred to the judgment of the
military and of Congress and conceded to the exigent circumstances
surrounding the war as proper justification for the internment of U.S.
178
citizens.
179
180
In Ex parte Quirin and In re Yamashita, the Court found permissible, pursuant to congressional authorization manifested in the
Articles of War, the Executive’s use of military commissions to try en-

172

249 U.S. 47 (1919).
Id. at 52.
174
See, e.g., United States v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Fromwerk v.
United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); see also REHNQUIST, supra note 160, at 178–82.
175
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
176
320 U.S. 81 (1943).
177
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215–17.
178
Id. at 218. The majority stated:
[W]e cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly
ascertained. We cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did not have ground for believing that in a critical hour such
persons could not be readily isolated and separately dealt with, and
constituted a menace to the national defense and safety, which demanded that prompt and adequate measures be taken to guard against
it.
Id. (quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99) (internal quotations omitted).
179
317 U.S. 1 (1942).
180
327 U.S. 1 (1946).
173
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181

emy combatants.
In Ex parte Quirin, eight German-born U.S. residents were tried for entering the United States during a period of war
182
They argued that the
for purposes of committing hostile acts.
President’s use of military commissions was without statutory or constitutional backing and, in turn, was violative of their constitutional
183
After holding that
rights inherent within a civil court proceeding.
184
Congress authorized the commissions, the Court held that, as
unlawful combatants, the prisoners had been charged with a crime
185
against the law of war, and that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
186
did not extend to military commissions.
Similarly, In re Yamashita,
and its trial by military commission of a Japanese military leader, held
that a U.S. military commander properly invoked a military commis187
sion in light of a President’s order and the Articles of War; that only
the political branches may determine to what extent war crimes may
188
be prosecuted prior to a declaration of peace; that the petitioner’s
189
alleged violation was a violation of the law of war; and that the defendant’s enemy combatant status precluded him from any of the
190
protections of the Articles of War.
Analyzing the curtailment of civil liberties in wartime, and the
aforementioned episodes in American history, Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized “the reluctance of courts to decide a case against the
191
government on an issue of national security during a war.”
Through his scholarship, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, in part,
that a court may defer to the government—or, in his words, manifest
“[j]udicial reluctance”—by avoiding the adjudication of “an impor192
tant constitutional question in the midst of a war,” or by deciding
“an issue in favor of the government during a war, when it would not
193
have done so had the decision come after the war was over.” These
181

Id. at 7, 20 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1).
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20–23.
183
Id. at 24.
184
Id. at 28–29.
185
Id. at 35–36.
186
Id. at 40.
187
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1946).
188
Id. at 13.
189
Id. at 17.
190
Id. at 19.
191
REHNQUIST, supra note 160, at 221.
192
Id. at 221–22. As an example of the Court’s constitutional avoidance during
wartime, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed to Hirabayashi and the Court’s narrow adjudication of the curfew requirement, thereby effectively avoiding any questions concerning the constitutionality of the relocation program. Id.; see also id. at 198.
193
Id. at 222. To illustrate this point, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained:
182
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aforementioned episodes both support Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
propositions and, as such, exemplify the traditional deference
adopted by the Judiciary in favor of the judgments of the government—the Executive and the Legislature—during times of war and
crisis, and in regard to military and foreign affairs and national secu194
rity.
B. Rasul v. Bush

195

In Rasul, the Court determined “whether United States courts
lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostili196
ties and incarcerated at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba.”
The case involved two Australian citizens and twelve Kuwaiti citizens
who were captured during hostilities between the United States and
the Taliban, and were detained in Guantanamo Bay along with ap197
proximately 640 other non-Americans who were similarly captured.
In challenging their detentions, the Australian and Kuwaiti detainees
brought separate actions seeking, among other things, to know the
198
charges against them and to have access to counsel and to courts.

Quirin, decided during the darkest days of World War II, actually cut
back on some of the extravagant dicta favorable to civil liberty in
Milligan. Of the three Japanese internment cases, only Endo, decided
near the end of World War II, represented even a minor victory for
civil liberty. And as for Duncan, the good news for the people of Hawaii
was that the court held that martial law there during World War II had
been unlawful; the bad news was that the decision came after the war
was over, and a year and a half after martial law had been ended by
presidential order.
Id. at 221.
194
Id. at 222–23. After recounting a number of these episodes in detail, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed:
In any civilized society the most important task is achieving a proper
balance between freedom and order. In wartime, reason and history
both suggest that this balance shifts to some degree in favor of order—
in favor of the government’s ability to deal with conditions that
threaten the national well-being. It simply cannot be said, therefore,
that in every conflict between individual liberty and governmental authority the former should prevail. And if we feel free to criticize court
decisions that curtail civil liberty, we must also feel free to look critically
at decisions favorable to civil liberty.
Id.
195
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
196
Id. at 470.
197
Id. at 470–71.
198
Id. at 471–72.
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The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens and joined by
Justices O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, held that the federal judiciary may exercise jurisdiction to determine the legality of
199
the Guantanamo Bay detainees’ detentions. To reach this holding,
the Court first distinguished the present case from the facts of Eisen200
trager, in which the Court refused to extend the constitutional writ
of habeas corpus and its enforceability by U.S. courts to foreign ene201
mies.
The Court then reasoned that the holding of Braden v. 30th
202
Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky “overruled the statutory predicate to
203
Eisentrager’s holding.” In its place, Braden held that a prisoner need
not be present within a district court’s territorial jurisdiction in order
to invoke habeas proceedings, because the federal habeas corpus
204
statute predicates its reach over the prisoner’s custodian’s presence
205
Furthermore,
within the jurisdiction and not that of the prisoner.
the Court found that Guantanamo Bay, by virtue of the United States’
agreement with Cuba and its plenary control derived therefrom, is
sovereign territory of the United States, and that federal court juris206
diction does extend there.
C. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld

207

The Court accepted the case of Hamdi “to consider the legality
of the Government’s detention of a United States citizen on United
States soil as an ‘enemy combatant’ and to address the process that is
constitutionally owed to one who seeks to challenge his classification
208
as such.”
The case stemmed from the arrest and military detain-

199

Id. at 485.
339 U.S. 763 (1950).
201
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475–76. Written in relevant part:
Petitioners in these cases differ from the Eisentrager detainees in important respects: They are not nationals of countries at war with the
United States, and they deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts
of aggression against the United States; they have never been afforded
access to any tribunal, much less charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and for more than two years they have been imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and
control.
Id. at 476.
202
410 U.S. 484 (1973).
203
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 479.
204
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000).
205
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478–79 (quoting Braden, 410 U.S. at 459–500).
206
Id. at 480–81.
207
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
208
Id. at 509.
200
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ment of Yaser Esam Hamdi, an American citizen born in Louisiana.
As a next friend, Hamdi’s father filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that, despite his son’s designation as an “enemy combatant,”
Hamdi should not be held indefinitely without access to counsel,
without evidentiary hearings at which he could contest factual allega210
tions, and without charges.
Writing for the plurality, Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, found that “the
AUMF is explicit congressional authorization,” so long as the detained citizen is designated an “enemy combatant,” that satisfies the
requirement in 18 U.S.C. Section 4001(a) that a U.S. citizen’s deten211
tion be “pursuant to an Act of Congress.”
Therefore, the Court
held that the detention of a U.S. citizen designated an enemy combatant “for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were
captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be
an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has au212
thorized the President to use.”
Having established the Executive’s authority to militarily detain
certain U.S. citizens, the Court turned its attention to what, if any,
process those citizen-detainees are entitled to in order to challenge
213
Here, the Court adopted the juditheir enemy combatant status.
214
cial-balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, in which a due process
conflict is settled by weighing “‘the private interest that will be affected by the official action’ against the Government’s asserted interest, ‘including the function involved’ and the burdens the Govern215
ment would face in providing greater process.” After balancing the
competing interests, the Court held that a citizen-detainee challenging his enemy combatant status must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification and be granted a fair opportunity to respond
216
The Court, however, also conbefore a neutral decision-maker.
cluded that exigent circumstances may necessitate a rebuttable presumption in favor of the government and its evidence, and that the
217
government’s hearsay evidence may be acceptable.
209

Id. at 510.
Id. at 511.
211
Id. at 516–17 (plurality opinion) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000)).
212
Id. at 518 (quoting AUMF, § 2, 115 Stat. at 224).
213
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 524 (plurality opinion).
214
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
215
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
216
Id. at 533.
217
Id. at 533–34.
210
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To conclude, Justice O’Connor pointedly rejected the Executive’s contention that “separation of powers principles mandate a
218
heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such circumstances.”
Justice O’Connor went on to write:
Indeed, the position that the courts must forgo any examination
of the individual case and focus exclusively on the legality of the
broader detention scheme cannot be mandated by any reasonable
view of separation of powers, as this approach serves only to condense power into a single branch of government. . . . [A] state of
war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the
219
rights of the Nation’s citizens.

D. Rumsfeld v. Padilla

220

Padilla involved the arrest and military detention of an American
citizen in Chicago who was accused of plotting to detonate a “dirty
221
bomb” and was subsequently designated an “enemy combatant.”
Padilla’s counsel challenged the constitutionality of Padilla’s deten222
The Court granted a
tion by filing a petition for habeas corpus.
writ of certiorari to decide if “Padilla properly file[d] his habeas petition in the Southern District of New York; and second, [whether] the
223
Chief
President possess[ed] authority to detain Padilla militarily.”
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority consisting of Justices
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, held that the respondent
wrongly filed his habeas petition in New York, and that he should
have filed in the United States District Court for the District of South
224
Carolina.
The Court reasoned that the language of the federal ha225
beas statute and the immediate custodian rule of Wales v. Whitney
require a prisoner to challenge his or her physical confinement
against “the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being
226
held.” Likewise, federal district courts may only grant habeas relief
227
“within their respective jurisdictions.”

218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227

Id. at 535–36.
Id.
542 U.S. 426 (2004).
Id. at 430–31.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 430.
Id. at 446–47.
114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885).
Padilla, 542 U.S. at 435.
Id. at 442 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000)).
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IV. HAMDAN’S HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
AND A CONGRESSIONAL CALL-TO-ARMS
Irrespective of their limitations, the previous “war on terror”
cases were nonetheless decided in favor of the detainees, and were
largely hailed as a rebuke to the Bush administration and its expan228
In accordance with these recent precesive anti-terrorism policies.
dents, Hamdan shares in the Court’s departure from traditionally deferring to the Executive in times of war, and in regard to military and
229
Hamdan, however, goes even
foreign affairs and national security.
further in scrutinizing the Executive’s actions. Specifically, it creates
military commissions to try non-citizen detainees, by essentially re230
quiring a more specific congressional authorization and by invoking
international law as both applicable and enforceable to the issues at
231
hand.
Perhaps more significant than Hamdan’s non-deferential
approach and its enforceable application of international law are the
232
This
separation-of-powers principles that these holdings invoke.
part of the Comment will look closely at the Court’s non-deferential
233
approach taken in Hamdan.
Following that analysis will be a con234
sideration of its implications.
A. Hamdan’s Heightened Scrutiny
This Comment considers Hamdan’s “heightened scrutiny” to
primarily refer to the Court’s inquiry into whether Congress offered
specific express authorization for the Executive’s actions. In addition, the Court arguably employed “heightened scrutiny” when it applied and enforced the Geneva Conventions against the Executive.
Both of these prongs are analyzed in turn.
1.

Specific Congressional Authorization

The overarching reason for Hamdan’s repudiation of the Executive’s military commission was the Court’s determination that such
commissions lack specific congressional authorization and are thus
235
unlawful.
In fact, on no fewer than four occasions does the Court
228

See supra notes 6, 153 and accompanying text.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
230
See infra Part IV.A.1.
231
See infra Part IV.A.2.
232
See infra Part IV.B.
233
See infra Part IV.A.
234
See infra Part IV.B.
235
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775, 2779, 2785 (2006); see also
Stephen Ellmann, The “Rule of Law” and the Military Commission, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
229
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reference the absence of specific congressional authorization and its
236
In light of Jusfatal consequences upon the military commissions.
tice Jackson’s influential analysis in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer concerning the interplay between presidential powers and
congressional pronouncements, the Court’s inquiry into whether or
not Congress approved the Executive’s use of military commissions
237
does not seem particularly unusual or revelatory.
Such a probing
inquiry, however, becomes more curious when contemplating the Judiciary’s traditional deference to the Executive in matters of war,
238
military and foreign affairs, and national security, and the alternative interpretations and precedents that were available to the Court.
Contrary to its traditional deference, the Court adopted a more critical approach. It employed a decidedly stricter scrutiny in its precedential and statutory interpretations to determine the lawfulness of
the Executive’s exercise of military power in a time of active hostilities
and struck down the use of military commissions under the attendant
circumstances.
If the Court desired to adhere to the tradition of judicial deference, reasonable options would have permitted such an approach.
Most assuredly, the Court could have relied upon Ex parte Quirin’s
holding:
By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15 [currently embodied in Article 21], Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it
may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases. Congress, in addition to making rules for the
government of our Armed Forces, has thus exercised its authority
to define and punish offenses against the law of nations by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military commissions to try persons for offenses which . . . are cogni761, 779–80 (2007). Explaining Hamdan’s significance as it relates to congressional
authority, Ellmann writes:
It seems fair to say that besides declaring that the President does not
have a blank check, the Court is also saying that Congress needs to get
back in the check-writing business before the courts will permit what
otherwise appear to be breaches of human rights. The majority Justices repeatedly make clear that the absence of statutory authorization
is important to their finding that the commissions are illegal, and reiterate that what is needed is “a more specific congressional authorization” or an “express statutory provision . . . .”
Id. (footnote omitted).
236
See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775, 2779, 2785.
237
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
238
See supra Part III.A.
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zable by such tribunals. . . . By his Order creating the present
Commission [the President] has undertaken to exercise the authority conferred upon him by Congress, and also such authority
as the Constitution itself gives the Commander in Chief, to direct
the performance of those functions which may constitutionally be
239
performed by the military arm of the nation in time of war.

A literal reading of Ex parte Quirin suggests that Supreme Court
precedent supports the proposition that Article 21, in and of itself,
constitutes sufficient congressional authorization for the Executive’s
240
use of military commissions.
The Court seemed to acknowledge
241
this proposition when it curtly refused to accept it. In its stead, the
Court recast Ex parte Quirin’s treatment of Article 15 as congressional
preservation, not authorization, of the Executive’s power to convene
military commissions, which may only be activated by express con242
Thus, it seems as if Hamdan overrules Ex
gressional authorization.
parte Quirin’s characterization of Article 21 without explicitly saying
243
so.
After Hamdan and its heightened standards, the military commissions espoused in Article 21 now appear to be available to the Executive, notwithstanding exigencies, only when expressly granted to it
244
by Congress.
Further reluctance on behalf of the Court to defer to the Executive is evident in the Court’s statutory interpretations. Even after casting limitations upon the Executive per Article 21, the Court could
have relied on Hamdi and its reading of the AUMF as sufficient to
245
trigger the Executive’s use of military commissions.
In Hamdi, the
plurality opinion held that Congress’s enactment of the AUMF served
both to activate the President’s war powers and to provide “explicit

239

Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942).
See id.
241
See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774 (“We have no occasion to revisit Quirin’s controversial characterization of Article of War 15 as congressional authorization for military commissions.”); see also id. at 2775 n.24 (“[I]t is noteworthy that the Court in Ex
parte Quirin . . . looked beyond Congress’s declaration of war and accompanying authorization for use of force during World War II, and relied instead on Article of War
15 to find that Congress had authorized the use of military commissions in some circumstances.”).
242
Id. at 2774.
243
See Samuel Estreicher & Diarmuid O’ Scannlain, The Limits of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 9 GREEN BAG 353 (2006) (“Hamdan requires the President to try Guantanamo
detainees by court-martial proceedings or seek from Congress express authorization
of the use of military commissions or some express alteration of court-martial procedures.”).
244
See id.
245
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517–18 (2004).
240
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246

congressional authorization for the detention of” citizen-detainees.
The plurality continued by emphasizing that the capture and detention of both lawful and unlawful combatants “is so fundamental and
accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and
247
appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the President to use.”
Therefore, the Hamdi plurality authorized the virtually indefinite detention of U.S. citizens, despite the absence of specific and unequivocal language within the AUMF setting forth such express congres248
Instead of requiring actual statutory words to
sional approval.
mandate the detention of enemy combatants, the plurality merely
implied congressional authorization from the AUMF’s phrase “necessary and appropriate force,” in connection to other relevant cases
249
and authorities.
Though detaining an alleged enemy combatant is certainly distinguishable from trying that combatant in a military commission, the
Hamdan Court could have interpreted the AUMF as broadly as did
250
the Hamdi plurality, and thus could have deemed the AUMF sufficient congressional authorization for the Executive’s use of such
commissions, especially in light of Ex parte Quirin and In re Yamashita.
Just as the AUMF satisfied the express congressional requirements of
251
18 U.S.C. Section 4001(a) in Hamdi, the AUMF could have triggered the Executive’s congressionally reserved power of 10 UCMJ section 821 to implement military commissions. Supporting this interpretation is Ex parte Quirin, which stated:
An important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of
measures by the military command not only to repel and defeat
the enemy, but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those
enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military ef252
fort have violated the law of war.

The Hamdan Court, however, chose not to find the use of military
commissions as an “incident of war” includable within Congress’s

246

Id. at 517.
Id. at 518 (quoting AUMF, § 2, 115 Stat. at 224).
248
See id.
249
See id. (quoting AUMF, § 2, 115 Stat. at 224).
250
See supra notes 211–12 and accompanying text.
251
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517–18.
252
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1942) (emphasis added); see also Hamdi, 542
U.S. at 518 (“The capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by ‘universal agreement and practice,’ are
‘important incident[s] of war.’”) (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28) (emphasis
added).
247
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conferral of “necessary and appropriate force” to the Executive.
Instead, the Court held that “there is nothing in the text or legislative
history of the AUMF even hinting that Congress intended to expand
254
Again,
or alter the authorization set forth in Article 21 of UCMJ.”
the Court sought and did not find a definitive congressional intent
sufficient to condone the Executive’s action.
Similarly, the Court interpreted the DTA narrowly and, despite
its adoption by Congress after the Executive’s creation of the military
commissions, found that the statute “contains no language authoriz255
The Court
ing that tribunal or any other at Guantanamo Bay.”
conceded that the DTA “recognize[s] the existence of Guantanamo
Bay commissions in the weakest sense, . . . because it references some
of the military orders governing them and creates limited judicial re256
The Court, however, also found
view of their final decision[s].”
that the statute reserved judgment on whether U.S. law applies to the
commissions and whether their standards and procedures are law257
A less deferential Court could have broadly construed Conful.
gress’s adoption of the DTA as impliedly authorizing, if not acquiescing to, the Executive’s use of military commissions, especially since
the DTA was debated and enacted in light of the commissions’ crea258
tion.
This Court, however, carefully scrutinized the DTA as it did
the UCMJ and the AUMF in requiring that Congress specifically and
expressly authorize the use of military commissions before the Execu259
tive may lawfully implement such an adjudicatory system.
This heightened scrutiny through which the Court gleaned congressional consent deviates from the traditional deference the Judiciary associates with executive action in matters of war, military and
260
The explicit and implicit
foreign affairs, and national security.

253
254
255
256
257
258
259

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775 (2006).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quotations omitted).
Id.
See id. at 2810–11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775. In relevant part:
Together, the UCMJ, the AUMF, and the DTA at most acknowledge a
general Presidential authority to convene military commissions in circumstances where justified under the “Constitution and laws,” including the law of war. Absent a more specific congressional authorization,
the task of this Court is, as it was in Quirin, to decide whether Hamdan’s military commission is so justified.

Id.
260

See supra Part III.A.
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ramifications of this stricter approach will be discussed later in this
261
Comment.
2.

Application and Enforceability of the Geneva
Conventions and International Law

Having struck down the Executive’s military commissions for
their lack of specific congressional authorization and their failure to
comply with the UCMJ, the Court had an ample opportunity to avoid
the issue of the Geneva Conventions’ applicability and enforceability
262
in the context of Guantanamo Bay detentions. The Court had pre263
viously postponed a similar deliberation in Hamdi.
By requiring
“uniformity” between the UCMJ’s courts-martial and any proposed
military commissions, the Court already established strong standards
and procedural protections for Hamdan and other detainees in the
264
As
event that the Executive attempted to resurrect commissions.
such, an extension of Geneva protections was not entirely necessary
to insulate Hamdan and other detainees from procedural abuses or
265
Nevertheless, the Court again evaded
adjudicatory insufficiencies.
judicial deference and averred limitations upon the Executive’s unilateral exercise of power by applying and enforcing the Geneva Con266
The Court held that
ventions to the Guantanamo Bay detainees.
the Geneva Conventions were part of the law of war, and were thus
267
incorporated and mandated into U.S. military affairs via Article 21.
In so doing, the Court reversed the deferential approach of the
268
D.C. Circuit.
The D.C. Circuit’s refusal to impose Geneva provisions upon the Executive’s military commissions was grounded in a
footnote in Johnson v. Eisentrager and the notion that the Geneva Conventions are beyond judicial enforceability and may only be enforced
269
That decision by the D.C.
by “political and military authorities.”

261

See infra Part IV.C.
For analogy to the Court’s traditional deference, see notes 191–94 and accompanying text.
263
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 n.2 (2004) (“Because we hold that
Hamdi is constitutionally entitled to the process described above, we need not address at this time whether any treaty guarantees him similar access to a tribunal for a
determination of his status.”).
264
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2791–93.
265
See id.
266
Id. at 2793–94.
267
Id. at 2794.
268
Id.
269
Id. (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 n.14 (1950)). Recalling
the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in Hamdan:
262
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Circuit, to which Chief Justice Roberts concurred as a D.C. Circuit
judge, provided a viable alternative for a deferential court that sought
to restrict its review of the Executive’s execution of a “war on ter270
271
This Court, however, had no such desire.
Instead, the
ror.”
Court held that, at the very least, Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions protects Hamdan and the detainees and guarantees
them hearings before a “regularly constituted court affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
272
peoples.”
In setting forth what “judicial guarantees . . . are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples,” a plurality of the Court accepted
the safeguards enumerated in Article 75 of Protocol I (“Article 75”)
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions along with the International Cove273
Even Justice Kennedy, who connant on Civil and Political Rights.
curred in the majority’s opinion, questioned the Court’s citation to
Article 75, thereby suggesting that the majority’s opinion was unnec274
Both Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy noted
essarily expansive.
that Article 75 was not expressly ratified by Congress, yet Justice Stevens adopted it as an acceptable and enforceable standard in his
275
opinion for the Court.
In the end, the Court’s enforceable application of the Geneva
Conventions further affirms the Court’s retreat from judicial deference to the Executive in war, military and foreign affairs, and national security. That the Court even relied upon other international
legal provisions beyond Common Article 3 shows the degree to which
the Court willingly departed from the Executive’s unilateral expectations.
We are not holding that these prisoners have no right which the military authorities are bound to respect. The United States, by the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, concluded with fortysix other countries, including the German Reich, an agreement upon
the treatment to be accorded captives. These prisoners claim to be and
are entitled to its protection. It is, however, the obvious scheme of the
Agreement that responsibility for observance and enforcement of these
rights is upon political and military authorities. Rights of alien enemies
are vindicated under it only through protests and intervention of protecting powers as the rights of our citizens against foreign governments
are vindicated only by Presidential intervention.
Id. at 2794 (quoting Johnson, 339 U.S. at 789).
270
See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2842–49 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
271
Id. at 2796 (majority opinion).
272
Id. (quoting Common Article 3, supra note 33, at 3320).
273
Id. at 2797, 2797 n.66 (plurality opinion).
274
Id. at 2809 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
275
Id. at 2797 (plurality opinion).
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B. Pulling Congress into the Fray
Underneath the substantive and procedural implications of the
“war on terror” decisions, the Court has, both expressly and impliedly, invited separation-of-powers principles into the “war on terror.”
Rasul was an assertion of judicial prerogative, albeit only procedurally, by extending federal judicial review into the detentions, and
276
thus into the Executive’s actions, at Guantanamo Bay. Hamdi spoke
with broad and vibrant language about the Court’s active role in ad277
judicating the Executive’s actions.
Now, Hamdan’s contribution to
the twenty-first century conception of the American tripartite government may be its resounding call to Congress—its invocation of
congressional action and responsibility in a time of war and crisis by
positioning the Legislature between the Executive and the Judiciary
278
so as to resolve significant disputes.
Some scholars note Congress’s persistent inertia and passivity in
regard to issues of national security and worried about the abun279
dance of power defaulting unto the Executive.
Others plead for
Congress to re-engage itself with America’s post-September 11 condition and to clarify the legal framework that seems conflicted by the
280
Executive’s unilateral actions in an amorphous global climate.
276

See supra Part III.B.
542 U.S. 507, 535–36 (2004).
278
See Ellmann, supra note 235, at 780 (“[I]n Hamdan, the Supreme Court has applied the ultimate enforcement weapon—it has barred particular Executive action at
least so long as Congress fails to affirmatively endorse it.”).
279
See, e.g., Neal Devins, Congress, Civil Liberties, and the War on Terrorism, 11 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1139, 1145–46 (2003). Professor Devins writes, in relevant part:
Against the backdrop of Congress’s declining role in war-making and
the diminished status of civil liberties during wartime, it is little wonder
that (1) the Bush administration has been the moving force in initiating war on terror-related limitations on civil liberties, (2) Congress has
largely facilitated presidential dominion of the war on terror by approving most provisions of legislation introduced by the White House and
generally standing on the sidelines when the President claimed that the
Constitution or existing law supported one or another initiative, and
(3) the public has backed most war-time limitations on civil liberties
(especially those of noncitizens).
Id.
280
See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, The Constitution in Crisis Times, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 11, 19–20 (2003) (arguing that Congress has a constitutional role
to play in our nation’s foreign affairs and national security). Professor Rakove writes,
in relevant part:
Rather than rely on a broad and indefinite notion of inherent executive power, mystically compressed in the first sentence of Article II,
constitutionalists today, as then, would want Congress to assert its responsibility as well as its power over an array of national security issues.
. . . If [military commissions are] the most appropriate way to deal with
277
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Perhaps most notably, John Hart Ely, years before the tragedies of
September 11, advocated for a judicial review that would rein in the
Executive’s unilateral initiation of a war by declaring it unconstitu281
In turn, Ely
tional in the absence of congressional authorization.
posited, the Judiciary would “remand” the issue to Congress, thereby
282
forcing the Legislature to discharge its constitutional duties. Essentially, the Court’s decision agrees with these assertions, and thus
serves as a formal invitation for Congress to enter the fray.
A reasonable, if not necessary, inference deriving from Hamdan’s
unrelenting heightened scrutiny is that the Court intended to implicate Congress into legitimizing or condemning the Executive’s military commissions by requiring Congress to clarify its intent with pre283
cise language henceforth.
This contention is more evident when
juxtaposing Hamdan and Hamdi. Contrary to Hamdi, the Court in
Hamdan required specific congressional authorization to enable the
284
Executive to achieve its goals, even in light of precedent favorable
285
Likewise, the Hamdan Court, unlike
to the Executive’s position.
Hamdi, would not accept anything less than express and unequivocal
congressional authorization in allowing a recent piece of legislation
286
Such distinctions not
to satisfy the provisions of a federal statute.
only serve to differentiate Hamdan and Hamdi’s plurality opinion, but
also illustrate the similarities between Hamdan and Hamdi’s dissents.
Notwithstanding their specific concerns for citizen-detainees, the
Hamdi dissents are precursors to Hamdan’s heightened scrutiny and
its mandate for congressional clarity.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, argued adamantly that
the detention of a U.S. citizen without the possibility of habeas corthe unusual prisoners, such a struggle will produce, so be it. But let the
sanctioning of this departure from conventional legal norms enjoy a
higher measure of legality than past precedent and presidential fiat can
provide.
. . . Congress should step up to the plate, recognizing that the protection of the national security is no less its duty and responsibility than
it is that of the president.
Id.
281

JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL
AND ITS AFTERMATH 54 (1993) [ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY].
282

LESSONS OF VIETNAM

See id.
Ellmann, supra note 235, at 780 (By requiring “more specific congressional authorization . . . [the Court] is also trying to impel Congress to take a responsibility
that Congress itself had not, at least not specifically, chosen to meet.”).
284
See supra Part IV.A.1.
285
See supra Part II.C.9. (discussing Justice Thomas’s Hamdan dissent); see also supra notes 239–44 and accompanying text.
286
See supra Part IV.A.1.
283
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pus requires specific congressional authorization in the form of a
287
Alternatively, Justice Scalia
constitutional suspension of the writ.
contended that the AUMF does not provide congressional consent
288
with requisite specificity to justify a U.S. citizen’s detention.
Likewise, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented
from the plurality’s decision by requiring clear and unequivocal congressional authorization to satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), thereby warranting the indefinite detainment of a U.S. citizen, and that such authorization is lacking when the Executive’s only “factual justification .
289
. . is a war on terrorism.” Pointing to his third reason for necessitating specific congressional authorization, Justice Souter reiterated the
logic of a tripartite government during times of war:
The defining character of American constitutional government is
its constant tension between security and liberty, serving both by
partial helpings of each. In a government of separated powers,
deciding finally on what is a reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or some condition in between) is
not well entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose
particular responsibility is to maintain security. For reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the Government asked to
counter a serious threat is not the branch on which to rest the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the balance between the will to
win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory; the responsibility
for security will naturally amplify the claim that security legiti290
mately raises.

Justice Souter thereby justified the need for “a clear statement of
[congressional] authorization” when stating: “[a] reasonable balance
is more likely to be reached on the judgment of a different branch . .
. . Hence the need for an assessment by Congress before citizens are
subject to lockup, and likewise the need for a clearly expressed con291
gressional resolution of the competing claims.”

287

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 573 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. Justice Scalia writes, in relevant part:
Contrary to the plurality’s view, I do not think this statute even authorizes detention of a citizen with the clarity necessary to satisfy the interpretive canon that statutes should be construed so as to avoid grave
constitutional concerns[;] . . . with the clarity necessary to comport
with [Supreme Court precedent]; or with the clarity necessary to overcome the statutory prescription [of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)].
Id. at 574 (citations omitted).
289
Id. at 542–45 (Souter, J., dissenting).
290
Id. at 545.
291
Id.
288
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The commonality shared by these four justices through these
two dissents is that, under the attendant circumstances, the Executive’s actions are unilateral and unlawful unless Congress, in one
manner or another, authorizes those actions with definitive, unambiguous consent. This requirement was not relegated to a dissenting
opinion in Hamdan but, rather, is the implicit bedrock of the major292
ity’s opinion.
Therefore, the Court’s message rings clearly in its
holding: If the Executive wants military commissions, the Executive
must convince Congress and receive the unequivocal endorsement of
a second branch of the American tripartite government.
In case these implications remained cryptically buried or misconstrued within the majority opinion, Hamdan’s concurrences expressly invite Congress to assert itself in the matter of Guantanamo
293
Justice
Bay and its role within the tripartite national government.
Breyer, joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, dedicated
the entirety of his short concurring opinion to the importance of
such:
The Court’s conclusion ultimately rests upon a single ground:
Congress has not issued the Executive a “blank check.” . . . Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.
Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultation with Congress, judicial insistence upon that consultation does not weaken our
Nation’s ability to deal with danger. To the contrary, that insistence strengthens the Nation’s ability to determine—through
democratic means—how best to do so. The Constitution places
its faith in those democratic means. Our Court today simply does
294
the same.

C. Justifications for Hamdan’s Congressional Invocation
As radical as Hamdan may seem to its critics, the Court’s decision
is a moderate, albeit vigorous and important, assertion entirely
grounded within the classic separation-of-powers principles that inform our tripartite national government. Though the Court adamantly struck down the Executive’s military commissions, it refrained
from the sort of decision-making that is often characterized as “judi295
cial activism.”
Instead, the Court expressly and impliedly shifted
292

See supra Part II.C.3.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).
294
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
295
“A philosophy of judicial decision-making whereby judges allow their personal
views about public policy, among other factors, to guide their decisions, usu[ally]
with the suggestion that adherents of this philosophy tend to find constitutional vio293
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the ultimate fate of those commissions to Congress.
In so doing,
the Court not only sustained its involvement in contemporary af297
fairs, but it also firmly implanted Congress onto the battlefields of
298
the “war on terror.” Whatever may be the wisdom of the legislative
response to Hamdan, the Court rightfully forced Congress to respond
and to be proactive, or—at the very least—forced Congress to take a
definitive and unequivocal stand on the issue of military commissions
299
and their entailments. Justifications for the Court’s non-deferential
approach and its insistence upon congressional action are rooted in
Congress’s unique role and capabilities within the American government and the unusual circumstances that comprise the “war on ter300
ror.”
Of course, in justifying the Court’s heightened scrutiny and its
congressional invocation, it bears repeating that this Comment assumes the veracity of an underlying premise. That premise, as mentioned by Justice Souter, is that the Executive is ill-equipped in striking a reasonable balance between national security and individual
301
liberties.
Hence, the Executive’s scope of power must be confined
within reason, and while the Judiciary can prevent the Executive from
unilaterally overextending, the Legislature is ultimately the proper
302
branch to define those limitations. Because the Executive’s actions
must be held in check and Congress had taken no authoritative
stance, the Court was right to uncharacteristically intrude upon the
Executive’s actions in Hamdan, as the Court has done generally in the
303
The Court’s reasoning in Hamdan is justifi“war on terror” cases.
304
able because it implicates Congress into a more active role.
1.

Congress’s Constitutional Role

Hamdan’s decision and its call-to-arms to Congress are justified,
first and foremost, by the Constitution and its prescribed role to
Congress in matters of war, military and foreign affairs, and national
security. The Constitution specifically mandates a number of such
lations and are willing to ignore precedent.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 862 (8th ed.
2004).
296
See supra Part IV.B.
297
See infra Part V.A.
298
See supra Part IV.B.
299
See supra Part IV.B.
300
See infra Parts IV.C.1–3.
301
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting).
302
See infra Parts IV.C.1–3.
303
See supra Parts III.B–D.
304
See infra Parts IV.C.1–3.
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obligations and responsibilities into the hands of Congress, including
the enumerated powers to “provide for the common Defence and
305
general Welfare of the United States,” to create and punish interna306
tional crimes and “Offenses against the Law of Nations,” to declare
307
war and promulgate laws regarding capture, to create and maintain
308
armies and a navy, to promulgate laws for the government and the
309
armed forces, and to call forth state militias and to govern them
310
By delegating a number of these awesome—and pointo action.
tentially devastating—powers to Congress, the Constitution bifurcates
the initiation and execution of war and other military operations between two branches, thereby minimizing the possibilities for misuse
311
Therefore, the Court’s heightened scrutiny and its exor abuse.
hortation for congressional action is vindicated through the Constitution’s design.
2. Institutional Competence and the “War on Terror”
For matters steeped in policy and opposing views, Congress, on
account of its institutional competence, has superior decision-making
312
capabilities in comparison to the Judiciary.
In other words, when
deliberating an issue, Congress, unlike the Judiciary, may regularly
hold hearings and engage in adversarial debates; entertain the testimony of experts, practitioners, and other luminaries within respective
313
fields; and sanction and publish reports, among other things.
Re305

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
307
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
308
Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 13.
309
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
310
Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 15, 16.
311
See Louis Fisher, Point/Counterpoint: Unchecked Presidential Wars, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 1637, 1637 (2000) (“With studied care and deliberation, the Framers of the
Constitution created a structure to prevent presidential wars. . . . Making fundamental judgments about representative government, popular control, and human nature,
they placed the power of war and peace with the legislative branch and divided foreign policy between the President and Congress.”); id. at 1645 (“The Framers deliberately divided government by making the President the commander-in-chief and
reserving to Congress the power to finance military expeditions. The Framers rejected a government in which a single branch could both make war and fund it.”).
312
See, e.g., Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 513 (1982) (“[R]elevant policy
considerations do not invariably point in one direction, and there is vehement disagreement over the validity of the assumptions underlying many of them. The very
difficulty of these policy considerations, and Congress’s superior institutional competence to pursue this debate, suggest that legislative not judicial solutions are preferable.”).
313
See, e.g., John Yoo, Enemy Combatants and the Problem of Judicial Competence, in
TERRORISM, THE LAWS OF WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: DEBATING THE ENEMY
306
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quiring specific congressional authorization, and refusing to interpretatively imply legislative consent where it may or may not exist, is
one manner in which the Court both respects Congress’s institutional
competence and also ensures that no lone branch is overreaching its
314
authority without the blessings of another. Hamdan’s refusal to defer to the Executive, its unclear statutory support for military commissions, and solicitation for further congressional action, are justified by
Congress’s institutional competence, and especially its practical relevance as it relates to the “war on terror” and the nature of terrorism
in general.
The so-called “war on terror,” and its ongoing hostilities between
the U.S. Armed Forces and terrorist organizations and individuals, is
at best a vague and nebulous encapsulation of the unique present-day
armed conflicts in which the United States is engaged. Its indefinite
and ill-defined features are in stark contrast to those of traditional
315
warfare.
Justice Souter alluded abstractly to this distinction between terrorism and traditional armed conflict when he wrote: “In a
government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or some
condition in between) is not well entrusted to the Executive branch of
316
Government . . . .”
The differences between combating terrorism and recognizable
enemies in traditional warfare are significant. For example, the “war
on terror” will likely endure for an indefinite duration because,
unlike traditional warfare that is predicated upon battles between nations and in accordance to the law of war and certain historical ex317
pectations, terrorism continuously thrives from often indistinguishCOMBATANT CASES 69, 91 (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2005) [hereinafter Yoo, Enemy Combatants] (“Congress can collect information itself or acquire it from the executive
branch or outside groups via relatively inexpensive hearings. Courts, however, cannot proactively collect information on a question before them.”).
314
See supra Part IV.B.
315
Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 68 n.13 (D.D.C. 2002) (“The United States
confronts an untraditional war that presents unique challenges in identifying a nebulous enemy. In earlier times when the United States was at war, discerning ‘the enemy’ was far easier than today.”).
316
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
317
Rakove, supra note 280, at 11. Rakove writes, in relevant part:
War, as conventionally understood, involves either conflicts between
nation states, or between insurgencies aspiring to become nation states
and the existing politics that dominate them. Such conflicts have finite
beginnings and endings, through the surrender or dispersal of one
side’s armed forces, the occupation of its territory, the collapse of its
governing institutions, or the negotiation of a peace.
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able or unrecognizable transnational collectives inspired to violence
by any number of social, economic, religious, or political indigni318
Because terrorists are often decentralized and have no alleties.
giance to any nationalistic entities, terrorism itself offers little opportunity for finite endings, whether through truce, compromise, or
319
absolute domination and surrender of the enemy. Likewise, terror320
ism presents both a domestic and an international threat.
Terrorists may be foreign fighters rampaging on the battlefields of Iraq and
Afghanistan, or they may be U.S. citizens infiltrating and wreaking
321
havoc upon the American homeland.
As a whole, the peculiarities of terrorism render Congress the
most appropriate branch to effectuate a response and to govern the
Executive’s actions. Congress’s institutional competence enables it to
more thoroughly evaluate and weigh the competing, multi-faceted
concerns and ramifications of terrorism, and to articulate a comprehensive course of action. Upon its choosing, Congress has the means
to return to an issue again and again if it finds circumstances necessitate an altered approach. Certainly, the unprecedented and unpredictable nature of terrorism may be such a circumstance.
On the contrary, the Judiciary is not a policy-making body but is
322
the arbiter of laws.
Consequently, the Judiciary’s review of terrorism cases depends upon the particularities of facts and the wisdom
Id.
318

Id. Again, in relevant part:
Terrorism on a massive scale has become, in effect, a condition that arguably will persist as far as we can see. This condition rests upon the
capacity of a small number of ideologically committed individuals to
exploit the horrifying wonders of technology in order to threaten the
security of modern society. . . . [I]t depends solely upon the probability
that small bands of fanatics could always wreak havoc on open societies
that can never adequately defend their multiple points of vulnerability.

Id.
319

Id. at 12. (“Terrorism’s shadowy nature enables its agents to lie dormant and
undetected for prolonged periods. Terrorism lacks a home territory to protect, organized armed forces to disperse, and political authority to dislodge. . . . One negotiates with enemies, but rarely, if ever, with terrorists.”).
320
See Yoo, Enemy Combatants, supra note 313, at 72 (“In previous modern American conflicts, hostilities were limited to a foreign battlefield, while the U.S. home
front remained safe behind the distances of two oceans. In this conflict, however,
the battlefield can occur anywhere, and there can be no strict division between the
front and home.”).
321
See id.
322
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). “It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply
the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two
laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.” Id.
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323

and constraints of judicial precedent.
By nature, courts are more
restricted in their opportunities and capabilities to examine terrorism
324
and its manifestations, and as a result judicial decisions may have
unintended or tragic effects unless Congress intercedes.
For instance, the Hamdi Court acknowledged the plaintiff’s con325
cerns about potentially indefinite detainment.
Relying on “longstanding law-of-war principles,” Justice O’Connor explained that
Hamdi’s detention could only endure “for the duration of the rele326
Jusvant conflict,” specifically the active hostilities in Afghanistan.
tice O’Connor, however, qualified that conclusion by stating: “If the
practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of
the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that
understanding may unravel. But that is not the situation we face as of
327
This flexible approach, while commendable, arguably
this date.”
reaches a wrong conclusion. The “practical circumstances” of the
328
“war on terror” do seem unlike previous conflicts.
For those reasons, the hostilities in Afghanistan will conceivably endure until terrorists and insurgents—Taliban, al Qaeda, and others—no longer
329
roam the country, or arguably the Middle East. In other words, the
“relevant conflict” in Afghanistan could persist for far longer than
323

John Yoo, War, Responsibility, and the Age of Terrorism, 57 STAN. L. REV. 793, 809
(2004) [Yoo, War, Responsibility] (“[C]ourts work best at interpreting formal sources
of law and applying the law to facts that are easily gathered and understood in the
context of a bipolar dispute. They do less well the more a dispute becomes polycentric, in that it involves more actors, more sources of law, and complicated social, economic, and political relationships.”); see also Yoo, Enemy Combtants, supra note 313, at
99. In describing the Judiciary’s deficiencies in handling foreign affairs and national
security, Yoo writes:
[The Judiciary’s] evenhandedness and passivity create problems in
gathering and processing information effectively and in coordinating
its policies with other national actors. Its procedural fairness and geographic decentralization prevent it from acting swiftly in a unified fashion, and it lacks effective tools for the rapid assimilation of feedback
and the correction of errors.
Id.
324
Yoo, War, Responsibility, supra note 323, at 809.
325
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519–20 (2004) (plurality opinion).
326
Id. at 521.
327
Id.
328
See supra notes 317–21 and accompanying text.
329
Recognizing the differences between previous conflicts and the “war on terror,” Steven R. Shapiro, the National Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties
Union, acknowledged “the need for closer judicial and political scrutiny” on account
of the belief that “[w]e do not have the luxury, therefore, of regarding any restrictions on liberty as temporary expedients, like wartime rationing. Instead, such restrictions must be regarded as potentially permanent transformations in America’s
constitutional value system.” Shapiro, supra note 164, at 116.
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any other U.S. armed conflict in history, and in the meantime, de330
tainees like Hamdi could remain captive.
This scenario alone serves to highlight the ongoing need for
congressional intervention to help define the parameters of the “war
on terror.” Whereas the Court is confined to specific, isolated circumstances as in Hamdi and Hamdan, Congress can repeatedly evaluate the amorphous nature of terrorism and the U.S. response in
331
broader swaths.
Therefore, Congress’s overview and its unique institutional competence, when coupled with its constitutional authority, render Congress the more capable decision-maker to evaluate the
“war on terror” and to provide clarity and balance to the Executive’s
programs.
3.

Transparency

Finally, Congress’s special relationship to the American people
also justifies the Court’s decision to rely on, if not force, congressional intervention in matters of Guantanamo Bay and terrorism.
Legislators must often answer directly to their constituents and the
public at large, and are thus accountable to the nation’s citizenry in a
332
way the Judiciary is not.
As such, legislators’ actions are informed
333
In this sense,
and tempered, to some extent, by citizens’ concerns.
along with the Executive and the Judiciary, the American people also
334
serve as a check and balance on the Legislature. Justice Scalia likely
had this in mind when he wrote in his Hamdi dissent: “If civil rights
are to be curtailed during wartime, it must be done openly and democratically, as the Constitution requires, rather than by silent ero335
Justice Scalia’s dissent, in
sion through an opinion of this Court.”
essence, begs for the transparency of decision-making that accompa336
nies a representative democracy.

330

See id.
See supra note 313 and accompanying note text.
332
See ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 281, at 4.
333
See id. (“Given the way the burdens of war get distributed, it was felt that the
people’s representatives should have a say. It was felt further that the involvement of
‘the people’s representatives’ would increase the participation of the people themselves in the debate.”) (parentheses omitted).
334
See id.
335
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 578 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
336
See id.
331
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V. SIGNING OVER THE “BLANK CHECK”:
CONGRESS’S RESPONSE TO HAMDAN
Shortly after the Court concluded its 2005–2006 term with the
Hamdan decision, Congress heeded the Court’s insistence for congressional action and adopted the Military Commissions Act of 2006
337
Initial reactions to the Act suggest that Congress handed
(“Act”).
to the Executive virtually all powers that the Executive originally as338
serted and subsequently sought.
Particularly interesting and relevant to this Comment, and the separation-of-powers doctrine in gen339
and its
eral, were the Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions
340
interpretational discretion assigned to the President.
This brief
337

Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
For instance, soon after the bill was passed by Congress and was awaiting President Bush’s approval, a New York Times news analysis characterized the pending Act
as follows:
Rather than reining in the formidable presidential powers Mr. Bush
and Vice President Dick Cheney have asserted since Sept. 11, 2001, the
law gives some of those powers a solid statutory foundation. . . . Taken
as a whole, the law will give the president more power over terrorism
suspects than he had before the Supreme Court decision this summer
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld . . . .
Scott Shane & Adam Liptak, Shifting Power to a President: Bill Creates Legal Basis for Policy on Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at A1.
339
Military Commissions Act § 7. Altering the DTA, the Military Commissions Act
reads, in pertinent part:
(e)(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of
an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the
United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant
or is awaiting such determination.
(2) [N]o court, justice, or judge shall have the jurisdiction to hear or
consider any other action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United
States and has been determined by the United States to have been
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall
take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply to
all cases, without exception, pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act which relate to any aspect of the detention, transfer,
treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an alien detained by the
United States since September 11, 2001.
Id.
340
Id. § 6. The Military Commissions Act reads, in pertinent part:
(a) IMPLEMENTATION OF TREATY OBLIGATIONS.—
(3) INTERPRETATION BY THE PRESIDENT.—
(A) As provided by the Constitution and by this section, the President
has the authority for the United States to interpret the meaning and
338
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part of the Comment explains that the Act and Congress’s actions are
injustices to the Court as it stands in the “war on terror.”
A. Respecting the Court’s Self-Perceived Role
By stripping the Court of any judicial review over Guantanamo
Bay, Congress blatantly disregarded the Court’s recent role and its
contributions to the rule of law for all persons within the dominion of
the United States. As evinced by the “war on terror” progeny of cases,
the Court envisioned itself as having a vital role in determining the
legality of the Executive’s actions and curtailing a potential, if not ac341
tuated, abuse of power.
This observation is most evident in the Rasul decision, in which
the Court empowered the Judiciary to peek into the Executive’s uni342
lateral actions in Guantanamo Bay.
In this sense, Rasul is the embodiment of the Court’s jurisprudential view of its contemporary
343
role. Thereafter, Hamdi was more pronounced and articulate in its
344
Upon proclaiming “a state of
insistence for judicial involvement.
345
war is not a blank check for the President,” Justice O’Connor set
forth a reminder: “Whatever the power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or
with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions

application of the Geneva Conventions and to promulgate higher
standards and administrative regulations for violations of treaty obligations which are not grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.
(B) The President shall issue interpretations described by subparagraph (A) by Executive Order published in the Federal Register.
(C) Any Executive Order published under this paragraph shall be authoritative (except as to grave breaches of common Article 3) as a matter of United States law, in the same manner as other administrative
regulations.
(D) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the constitutional functions and responsibilities of Congress and the judicial
branch of the United States.
Id.
341

Shapiro, supra note 164, at 115 (“[I]t seems increasingly clear that the courts in
this country are less willing today than they have been in the past to retreat to the
sidelines whenever the government raises a national security claim, regardless of its
impact on individual rights. That attitude is apparent in Hamdi and Rasul . . . .”).
342
Id. at 108 (“Rasul now stands as a strong affirmation of the judiciary’s role as
the ultimate safeguard against arbitrary detention, in wartime as well as peacetime,
for aliens as well as citizens.”).
343
See id.
344
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535–36 (2004).
345
Id. at 536.
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a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.” Finally,
in Hamdan, the Court, reprising its Rasul approach, narrowly interpreted a potentially jurisdiction-stripping DTA, meanwhile sidestepping precedential obstacles, as to enable the Court to adjudicate the
legality of the Executive’s unilateral actions, i.e., military commis347
sions.
348
Given the tradition of judicial deference, the Court could have
reasonably foreclosed its review of matters relating to Guantanamo
349
Bay and the “war on terror.”
In this unorthodox moment of history, however, the Court rightfully perceived itself as a necessary participant in balancing the powers of the tripartite national government
350
and guaranteeing an adequate application of law. Congress’s response to the Court’s solicitation for congressional action in Hamdan,
effectively stymieing judicial involvement, is disrespectful toward the
351
Whereas ConCourt’s self-perceived role in contemporary affairs.
gress could have simply legitimized the Executive’s actions and left
any remaining questions determinable by the Judiciary, Congress effectively stilted the separation-of-powers principles by essentially
eliminating one branch of government, against the better judgment
352
exercised by that very branch.
B. The Court as Protector of Individual Rights
Though the Court’s self-perception, in and of itself, warrants at
least some congressional acknowledgement, other considerations cast
doubt upon the wisdom of the Military Commissions Act. Most notably, the Court’s “war on terror” decisions have, in essence, positioned
the Court as a protector of individual rights and, in turn, as a polariz353
ing opponent to the Executive’s unilateral actions. These practical

346

Id. (emphasis added). The plurality opinion then cited to Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“[I]t was the ‘central judgment of the Framers of the
Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.’”).
347
See supra Part II.B.1.; see also notes 255–59 and accompanying text.
348
See supra Part III.A.
349
See, e.g., supra Part IV.A.1.
350
See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
351
See Shane & Liptak, supra note 338, at A11 (“Over all, the [Military Commissions Act] reallocates power among the three branches of government, taking authority away from the judiciary and handing it to the president.”). In the same article, Professor Bruce Ackerman warned: “If Congress can strip courts of jurisdiction
over cases because it fears their outcome, judicial independence is threatened.” Id.
352
See id.
353
Ellmann, supra note 235, at 788. For example, Ellmann writes:

MULRYNE_FINAL_V2

2008]

1/7/2008 6:46:53 PM

COMMENT

325

effects of the Court’s recent jurisprudence justify a congressional
embrace of the Court’s persistent role for purposes of guaranteeing
liberty to all persons and for ensuring informed legislative involve354
ment.
John Hart Ely expounded an analogous theory of the Court’s as355
sumed role.
Relying upon the famous Carolene Products Co. foot356
note, Ely set forth the vision of a “participation-oriented, represen357
tative-reinforcing approach to judicial review” that would see the
Judiciary intervene and constitutionally adjudicate in an effort to rectify any procedural “malfunction” within our representative democ358
Ely concluded that this judicial review would seek to correct
racy.
the procedural and participatory shortcomings in our government’s
decision-making—and not the substantive decisions themselves—that
359
burden minorities.

It is hard not to think that in turning to the principles of the rule of
law, the Supreme Court’s majority in Hamdan was moving towards a
rights-minded use of the rules of statutory interpretation, and doing so
out of a sense that in our conduct of the war against terrorism we may
have lost our constitutional bearings and fallen far short of what a fundamentally decent constitutional order requires. The Court clearly
hoped that Congress, pressed back into engagement, would vindicate
its faith in democracy—but the case also reflects, I think, the Court’s
fear that of the three branches of government, perhaps it alone was
then committed to adhering to the Constitution and laws in the midst
of war.
Id.
354

See id.
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 77
(1980) [ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST].
356
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Footnote four reads, in relevant part: “[W]hether prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.” Id. (citations
omitted).
357
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 355, at 87.
358
See id. at 103. Ely describes a “malfunction” as occurring when:
[T]he process is undeserving of trust, when (1) the ins are choking off
the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the
outs will stay out, or (2) though no one is actually denied a voice or a
vote, representatives beholden to an effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority the protection afforded other groups by a
representative system.
Id.
359
Id. at 181 (“[T]he general theory is one that bounds judicial review under the
Constitution’s open-ended provisions by insisting that it can appropriately concern
355
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The Court adopted an analogous approach insofar as it values
Congress’s role but seeks to protect the “discrete and insular minorities” that Congress overlooks, which in this case are the Guantanamo
360
Bay detainees.
With the exception of Padilla, each of the Court’s
“war on terror” decisions were decided in favor of the detainees and,
at least theoretically and notwithstanding congressional repeal, provided some rights or protections to them: Rasul guaranteed the detainees’ right to have their habeas corpus petitions heard in federal
361
district courts; Hamdi ensured certain due process rights to citizen362
detainees seeking to challenge an “enemy-combatant” status; and
Hamdan required that military commissions essentially adhere to
those protections enumerated within the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions and, in effect, provide fair and objective hearings for alleged
363
enemy combatants.
Again, Hamdan is even more startling in its protection of individual rights because it authoritatively extended the rights and protections of Common Article 3, along with other international law
364
provisions, to the detainees.
The breadth and impact of that decision is more pronounced by acknowledging that the Court already
guaranteed the detainees greater protections by requiring military
commissions to adopt the standards and procedures of courts365
marital, and that the Court cited to specific international law provi366
sions that are not necessarily included within U.S. jurisprudence.
Especially in its reliance on international law and precedents, the
Hamdan Court has contributed to what may be perceived as a Supreme Court trend in which the Court invokes international law or
367
exports U.S. law abroad to protect individual rights. Beyond Guantanamo Bay, the internationalization of the Court and its concern for

itself only with questions of participation, and not with the substantive merits of the
political choice under attack.”).
360
This analogy is merely anecdotal and speaks to the observation that neither
Congress nor American citizens are particularly concerned about the “enemy combatants,” and their rights, locked away in Guantanamo Bay. This Comment does not
intend to implicate constitutional doctrines, such as the Equal Protection Clause, in
the “war on terror” cases.
361
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004).
362
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
363
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2792–93 (2006).
364
Id. at 2794–95, 2797–98.
365
Id. at 2792–93.
366
Id. at 2797–98.
367
See Harlan Grant Cohen, Supremacy and Diplomacy: The International Law of the
U.S. Supreme Court, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 273, 321 (2006).
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human rights has reached issues of homosexuality, the death pen369
370
alty, and violations of international legal norms.
Though it has refrained from invoking constitutional principles
as contemplated by Ely, the Court relied upon a number of adjudicatory and interpretational nuances to find a way to insert itself into the
“war on terror” and to extend the aforementioned protections to the
detainees. The Court narrowly construed congressionally enacted,
371
jurisdiction-stripping provisions. It ignored or reinterpreted prece372
dent unfavorable to the detainees.
It read statutes in favor of the
373
It implored a balancing test to weigh citizendetainees’ interests.
374
And, of course, most recently, the
detainees’ constitutional rights.
Court—to use the words of Carolene Products’ footnote four—asserted
375
“a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry” by requiring
376
specific congressional authorization and enforcing the application
of international legal standards and procedures on behalf of the de377
tainees.
All of these efforts positioned the Court as the most reliable—
or, at least, the most likely—protector of individual rights for the
Guantanamo Bay detainees and other persons subject to U.S. military
378
action abroad.
While it remains Congress’s prerogative to defer to
368

See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002).
370
See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
371
See, e.g., Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2764–66 (interpreting DTA to allow Supreme
Court review of military commission’s legality).
372
See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 476–81 (2004) (holding Guantanamo Bay
is part of U.S. sovereign territory, and interpreting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1950), Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973), and Ahrens v.
Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), as allowing for federal judicial review of habeas corpus
petitions in Guantanamo Bay); Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774, 2788–89 (interpreting Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) and In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), as unpersuasive
regarding military commissions at issue); id. at 2776 n.27, 2783 (distinguishing Civil
War precedent from current matters).
373
See, e.g., Hamdan, 142 S. Ct. at 2792 (holding military commissions as unlawful
pursuant to Article 36 of the UCMJ); Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478–79 (holding federal habeas statute allows for federal judiciary review so long as petition is served within jurisdiction of petitioner’s custodian).
374
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 533 (2004) (holding balancing test
from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), mandates that citizen-detainee have
factual hearing in compliance to due process requirements).
375
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
376
See supra Part IV.A.1.
377
See supra Part IV.A.2.
378
Diane Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263, 266 (2004).
Arguing for the Supreme Court of the United States to assert itself in matters relating
369

MULRYNE_FINAL_V2

328

1/7/2008 6:46:53 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:279

or validate the Executive’s wishes, as it did pursuant to the Military
Commissions Act, Congress would have been well-advised to let the
Court, and the federal judiciary at large, remain an active and robust
participant, and a requisite check and balance, in the “war on ter379
Only mutual appreciation between the Legislature and the
ror.”
Judiciary—an active Judiciary—could ensure fairness for all human
beings plagued by terrorism, including alleged enemy combatants, and
to guarantee the protections of law everywhere, including within “law380
less enclaves” and “legal black holes” such as Guantanamo Bay.
VI. CONCLUSION
Following the recent precedent of Rasul, Hamdi, and Padilla, the
Court in Hamdan departed from a tradition of judicial deference to
the Executive in war, military and foreign affairs, and national security. In so doing, the Court reviewed the “war on terror” actions of
the Executive, specifically its implementation of military commissions
to try alleged enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, and ultimately
to the Executive’s actions in Guantanamo Bay, and to invoke international law—or
“external norms”—as a means to ensure fundamental human rights, Amann writes:
[Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),] is but the latest in which the
Court has looked to other sources of law to assure full and fair constitutional interpretation. These external norms, not unlike many of the
Court’s decisions in the last half-century, accord a central position to
the human person. Basic rights vest at birth and admit no derogation
absent the most dire emergency. Applied to matters like Guantanamo,
those foundational principles require judicial abandonment of outdated deference doctrines that work to strip loathed individuals of
fundamental rights.
Id.
379
Id. at 319. Amann warns:
Far from standing as Madison’s “impenetrable bulwark” against assumption of power, a court that declines [or is congressionally disallowed] to enforce the Constitution [or applicable international law] at
Guantanamo helps circumvent the constitutional separation of powers
that protects personal liberty. In this particular and most exceptional
context, U.S. courts must choose the duty to protect over deference to
the President. Searching judicial review should examine whether the
executive’s policy deprives individuals of basic rights and, if so, whether
those deprivations are justified.
Id. (citations omitted).
380
Id. at 316. Amann writes:
Human rights abhor a vacuum; specifically, the relegation of human
beings to an existence emptied of human rights protection. External
norms teach that when state action touches on human rights the courts
empowered to review the validity of that state’s conduct—in this case,
the courts of the United States—must fill the vacuum by protecting
personal rights against government abuse.
Id. (citations omitted).
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381

struck down those actions as unlawful. Beyond its practical implications, the significance of Hamdan, as was true for Rasul and Hamdi, is
the Court’s assertion of a stronger separation-of-powers doctrine. By
requiring specific congressional authorization, the Hamdan Court justifiably forced Congress to regulate terrorism, or, more appropriately,
to check the Executive’s handling of terrorism.
Through the Military Commissions Act, Congress significantly
limited the Court’s involvement in the “war on terror.” Whatever
may be said of the Act’s legal bases, the Act’s underlying policy seems
misplaced. Respect for the Court’s self-perceived and presumed roles
in a tripartite national government and for individual rights would
suggest that Congress’s legislative response to Hamdan, irrespective of
its policy decisions regarding the Executive, should include a substantial role for the federal judiciary. The Court’s response to the Military Commissions Act and the future of this tripartite battle royal are
beyond the scope of this Comment. The Court should continue,
where possible, to finesse judicial oversight into matters relating to
382
In the “war on terror,”
the “war on terror” and Guantanamo Bay.
the Court’s unprecedented contributions, inasmuch as they provide
another check and balance upon the other two branches and ensure
adequate room within which individual liberties may breath, are invaluable and irreplaceable.

381

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775, 2786, 2793 (2006).
Illustrated by its decision to hear a constitutional challenge to the Military
Commissions Act during its 2007–2008 term, the Court seemingly agrees with this
proposition. See Linda Greenhouse, Guantanamo Legal Battle Is Resuming: Rights of Detainees Will Get Third Round Before Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 2, 2007, at A14. (“In
a surprising about-face the day after it concluded its term in June, the Supreme
Court accepted renewed appeals on behalf of two groups of detainees and agreed to
decide whether the [Military Commissions Act] is constitutional.”). Reporting on
this event, Greenhouse astutely observed the significance of the Court’s decision to
hear this pending case when she wrote: “Now, as the parties prepare for their next
Supreme Court confrontation later this fall, the arguments have come full circle to
where they began: over the role of the federal courts.” Id.
382

